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HECA

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Introduction

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- states the principal theme of Book II is the possibility of retaliatory theory by Castro & that the CIA operations specifically may have caused any possible actions by Castro.
- the CIA notes that many tensions between the U.S. & U.S.S.R. & Cuba existed at the time-
- p. 3 - states that the persons involved at a senior level in the invert of 1964 (Warren Comm) are no longer in the CIA
- primary reliance placed on the records; looked into all Cuban operations & carefully analyzed the content & nature with sp. attention to security contained in tabs B-G
- CIA also conducted an invert. looking at the "other end" - to see if a theoretical provocation theory could have occurred.
- feels that the SSC tried to make AMLASH fit this pattern. (p.5)

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- Report concludes that the WC invert. the possibility of Cuban or Soviet involvement & did not find it - since the WC did not report anything it did not exist "To hold differently would be to accept uncritically a social paranoia often prevalent today, which ~~SECRET~~ would hold that a significant number of government employees could engage in such a well-disciplined conspiracy to suppress evidence.

(P5)

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p.6 - AMTRONIK operation, started in 1963,

- purpose - join dissident elements in Cuban leadership in effort to oust Castro. - slow in developing; little progress during JFK's life. In 1965, it was believed to be compromised & CIA withdrew from the operation.

- states that there are basic questions about the security of the operation. - Carter coven have known from the beginning.

- since it did not develop momentum until after JFK's death, probably not related.

p.6 AMLASH - SSC says that this operation planned Castro's assassination. preceded the murder of JFK; the CIA holds otherwise. "prior to the Pres' assassination not only had CIA not agreed to give any support to AMLASH /1, but had rejected his proposals to assassinate Castro." (P7)

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- Rpt then says that the SSC was offered this confirming evidence but dismissed it out of hand as false - SSC would only admit that AMLASH /1 was at least indifferent to his actions. Rpt says that the SSC suggests that he "may have been acting for Castro as a provocateur, to lead the US into a plot against Castro's life which is how ~~he~~ was then to provide Castro with the justification to order President Kennedy's assassination." (P7)

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- Rpt says that had Castro learned of AMLASH /

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he would only know that an inconclusive relationship existed.

TAB A

• - response to Book II object - study group established to review the problem - chaired by a rep. from the D of I & - also consisted of members from CI staff, LA Division, & OS. (p. 1)

Two points emphasized.

1) "to conduct a full review of information and operations on the Cuban target to identify any activity that might relate to the assassination of Pres. Kennedy, and
2) to review the possibility that CIA activities against Cuba, did, by their nature, cause Castro to order the assassination of President Kennedy." (p. 1-2)

good
indication

- main files for the second need is
LA DIVISION
CI STAFF } Directorate of Operations

- also less voluminous files need is OS & I & (p. 2)

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L4 DIVISION - file review from 1 Jan 61
to 1 Jan 65. (p.2)

- research group composed of 5 full-time
researchers, a group leader & a task
force supervisor - an additional 4
researchers participated in different phases.
(p.2)

Type & Number of Files Recd (p.3)

(1) Operational

(601 with findings and 1,128 1,729
with no findings)

(2) Subject files

(186 with findings & 361 547
with no findings)

(3) Cesta Policy File

101

(4) Chief, WH DIVISION Chrono File)

37

(TASK FORCE W Chronos)

(5) Official 201 Dossiers

100-plus

total 2,514

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- the Agency also notes that as a result of a memorandum prepared by the Cuban desk, in August 1975, they had traces of the names that appeared in the so-called Black book (that) Castro passed to McGovern. (p 4)

C-I STAFF

- assigned one senior officer to review the files in LHO.

"Overall File" - so called - nonfills 57 volumes - comprises some 142 file folder and portfolios. - has also accumulated some 50 supplemental files.

- this is now the Agency's central repository for info & documentation, a L-file of LHO

- b. Agency's role in the invest 1963-64
- c. Testimony by various Agency officers before several commissions & committees.
- d. FOIA request responses. (p 6)

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Office of Security

- assigned one officer to identify material; included volume in LHO, AMLASH, various and connected with the Criminal Underworld Plot, and a collection of names concerning name trace conducted at the time of the Garrison investigation. p 8

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Officer of the General

- two members of staff - also employed
on a contract a retired employee who had
served as a special case officer in Mexico City
during the period preceding JFK's death
& during the investigation afterwards. - conducted
an extensive review of all Mexico City records. p 9

~~REMOVED~~

Terms of Reference Agreement 4 Aug 76

p. 6 - signed by

S.D. Breckinridge

OIG

Robert Wall OI

William Sturibits LA Division

Raymond Beardson OS

TAB B CIA Performance on the Inquiries

p. 1 - says that Book II of the SCC Final Report
portrayed a pattern of neglect not
supported by the evidence.

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- mentions "D"

AMASH - p(2)

Oswald's hand p. 3 - 5

- this section deals with Book II allegations
of mishandling various aspects of
the investigation - it does not
deal with the relaxation ideas.

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p.10 - mention the two Cubana flights
to Havana from Mexico City on 22 November
& 27 Nov 1963 -

p.11 - CIA conducted regular surveillance of
Cubana flights - filing each report to Agency.
- one unilateral CIA surveillance team -
LIFIRE - reported on departure & arrivals.

p.11 - also, a telephone operation (LIE NUOY)
against the Cuban embassy provided
transcripts of conversations with the
Cubana office & the Mex. Airport Control
Office.

TABC CIA OPERATIONS AGAINST CUBA

p.6 - areas of operational activity

1. Oper. directed against Cuban
leadership - AMTRUNK

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2. Oper. involving the criminal underworld.

3. Other reports to assassinate Castro.

Operations AMTRUNK - p. 7

- to develop capability for splitting the
leadership of Cuba & eventual overthrow
never reached the point of implementation -

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P. 7

early 1963 - two Cuban exiles - worked to
change Cuba

{ Nestor Antonio Moreno Lopez
Enrique Cayardo Lora

developed operational concept "Leonard Plan"

P. 8

- assoc of Moreno was Jorge Alejandro
Volsky - in Miami in 1961.

P. 8

Cayardo & Moreno - discussed plan with
Volsky - Volsky then discussed it
with Tadeusz Witold Szulc, NYTIMES.

P. 8

- Szulc had developed friendship with
many Cubans and Ambassador
John C. Wilcy. Szulc reportedly
could see both Kennedys & Bundy any
time he wanted.

- early '63 - Szulc arranged an int. in
dash with Mr. Richard Goodwin, a
white House advisor.

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Volsky & Szulc then met with Robert
Havratch, a senior official in the
Dept of State, who presented the concept
to the CIA with approval. CIA
assigned it to Miami station - known
as AMTRUNK

P. 8.

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P. 9 AMTRUNK - concerned at identifying key
personnel in Cuban Armed forces who could be

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used to overthrow the Castro regime.

p 9 - by Aug, 1963, events had still not progressed far

early Sep 1 1963 AMTANWIC had 3
intelligence sources in Cuba:

Miguel A. Diaz Salgue
Ramon Guin Hector Robello
Modesta Orozco Basulto

One of these sources, Guin, was close
to AMALASH/1. p 9

- nothing developed over many months; by
1965 its security had been seriously
jeopardized & the decision was made
to end all connection. (p. 10)

p.11 - CIA says they dismiss this operator
because of its weakness from the beginning -
say that Szulc & Volsky are highly
suspect & are discounted - also one
other person.

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Tad Szulc - suspect since '48 when FBI
records said he was a Communist -
his daughter, Nicole Szulc, replied
an anti-Communist. She is believed
to be an agent of the Cuban D.G.I.
details about Tad Szulc are unconfirmed

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but still alive.

P-11 Jorge Ajbuszyc Volosky - like Szulc, of Polish origin; Volosky & Szulc became acquainted during 59-60 in Cuba. suspected of being a Communist, not confirmed.

P-12. Jose Ricardo ~~Rabel~~ Nunez

P-13 - involved in AMTRAK ~~to~~ crash the JMWAVE station - accusation that he was a Cuban agent - never proven.

P-14 CIA says there was very little planning and no ~~to~~ concrete planning of AMTRAK during JFK's proper left

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NEW CONSIDERATIONS ON THE SYNDICATE OPERATION



P-14 - mentions a by-line story by Paul Meskin in the NY Times, 20-25 April, 1975, which quoted Frank Sturgis

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Sturgis says the train arms scheme involved a bomb in Castro's office - Sturgis says he knew Juan Díaz.

Daily
Press

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p.15 - CIA says this news article is the first public reference to Juan Orta in the role of assassin in the plan against Castro.

p16 - Orta was the man the CIA had, in the operation with the syndicate, to kill Castro
says that the plan failed (poison) because
Orta lost his position in January, 1961 -
prior to delivery of the pills in late
Feb or early March 1961

p.16 says that Orta's sole run over when
he took refuge in the Venezuelan Embassy
in Havana in 1961 - April. left
Cuba in 1964 & settled in Miami in
Feb 1965.

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on p.15 the rpt says that Sleeps claimed
on a number of occasions that he had as said
official relationship was an employee of
the CIA, although no record of
any such relationship.

⑩ "He was in contact with some of the CIA Cuban
employees in the Miami area, but had
no direct relationships with the Agency."

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~~SECRET~~

(8)

p. 17 - rpt says that because Sturgis knew of Orla's involvement in some plot, it raises the question of whether Sturgis may have been a source of info to Castro.

p. 17 - New York Daily News - 13 June 76 - refers to possible relationship b/w Sturgis & Trappante - also mentions Norman Rothman as a gambling partner of Trappante.

p. 7 - says that it is interesting to note that Juan Orla's availability to the Mafia was understood to be due to his having lost payoffs that he had once received from gambling interests.

Then goes on to say two ways for Sturgis & Orla to have known each other

1. mutual gambling activities

2. heads of gambling activities

11112665

p. 18 NY Daily News - 1976 - story that Marie Lorenz in 1960 acted for Sturgis in an attempt to assassinate Castro. This story says that soon after her mission failed the CIA recruited mafia mobsters to kill Castro.

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Lorenz claims that the plan involved the use of poison pills concealed

~~SECRET~~

in a jar of face cream; she said they dissolved & could not be used.

p. 18 - Not next mention Oct 10, 1960 FBI

memo re: Grancana - concludes that it

involves a woman to kill Castro but that the date is too early for the CIA work. (no delivery until late Feb. 1961) ~~not~~ says that the syndicate may have been moving on its own.

p79 Following collapse of CIA's access to Castro through Orta, Roselli said he knew Cuban exile leader, DeVerma, who might join. - mentions that Verma not satisfied with the CIA support of the exile movement to date & that the Miami Station suspected he was not keeping bargain with agency.

~~*~~ - concludes that Verma may have already been involved in plot with major when CIA approached him. Two FBI rpt bear on this:

1) 21 Dec 60 - Cen und. support for some Cuban

p 20 2) 18 Jan 61 - Verma one of those rec. support, not confirmed.

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~~SECRET~~

(P)

p20 - Rpt says that although the operator with maps called off after BOP (4-61), it seemed like it was still going on after re-activated. April, 1962.

p26 Agent messages in 1961 concerning Plans to Kill Castro

p26 3 messages - seem to relate to same plan - same agnts.

27 March 1961 - sent by an Agency asset, AM BRONC 15. - proposed sabotage of an elec. co. in Havana; could be coordinated with attempt against Fidel or public appearance at Sports Palace." said that the attempt "against Fidel (s) is in accordance with general plan." No record if this was answered.

p27 25 March 61 - same agent sent another message - said plan via scheduled for April 9th. Castro to talk at palace & "assassination attempt at said place (will be) followed by a general pd shelling. off of main electric plants in Havana." ~~SECRET~~

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answered on 30 March - saying major effort should be launched on date you ~~are~~ selected - the message addressed the general issue &

~~SECRET~~

made no comment on proposal to
Kill Castro.

5 April 1961 - presumably from same
agent - mentions that the persons
he had been directed to contact only
had arms for 50 men. "While
stating that the sabotage of the electric
company and 'possibly attempt on
Fidel' would be carried out 9 April,
he emphasized that to do so would
make it impossible to maintain a
clandestine organization in Cuba;
"your military aid is decisive. If
it does not come that date we are lost."

- no indicator that the message was answered;
no further reference found.

P 27 - rpt mentions that the case officer
responsible for one of them as well as the
files were reviewed.

AMBISONC/5 - agent who sent out the
message outlining the proposed sabotage
& attempt against Castro.

P 28 201 File open 15 July 1960

OA issued 31 JAN 62.

arrested 29 May 1962

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executed 30 August 62.

~~SECRET~~

reported that he never admitted being CIA;

~~SECRET~~

name not in the book given Sen McGovern
by Castro.

p 29 AMCOAX/1 - one of those AMBRONC/5 was
told to contact POA 5 Jan 61 -
arrested 17 Aug 61 - serving 30 yr
sentence - in book for Sen McGovern
mission: organize paramilitary
activities in Cuba

p 29 AMRUB/1 - another one AMBRONC/5
told to contact for his general plan
in April 1961.
arrested July 1961 - 30 yr sentence
name in list given to Sen McGovern
mission: organize resistance groups.

p 30 AMPANIC/7
- arrested ~~20~~ 23 April 61 -
30 yr term - name among those
from McGovern - mission: organize
resistance groups.

11112669

p 31 - the 9 April 61 mission by
AMBRONC/5 did not come off -
his mission was to organize resistance
groups - he had no express mission
to hit Castro personally, although
it is clear no specific objection was
raised when he mentioned attempting
to do so.

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- the other men, many of whom had an assassination mission, are now serving 30 yr terms.

P 32 another agent message did 4 June 61 - asked about a man who called himself Moro-Satori of the Italian Embassy - claimed to work for U.S. Intel & to be in touch with me, Martin Elena & others - who " " has plans for an invasion within 30 days, after the killing of F.d.l.

a reply did 6 June, stated that this info was untrue -

- the originator of the agent message cannot be identified.

P 33 another message 3 May 61 - from a member of Rev Recovery ~~is~~ Pro Movement in Cuba said " " will try to kill F.d.l. today " " a reply 4 May told the agent & his companions to lay low -


11112670

- no follow-up messages - agent possibly AMUB/1, but ~~SECRET~~
his ~~1960~~ mission did not include assassination.

~~SECRET~~

P 28 - a debriefing of AMBRUNA/5 -
NOV 1960 - revealed he had contact
with people who had plotted killing Castro -
claimed to have had similar plan -

TAB D - AMLASH


p1 - Let us say that the ~~SSC~~ SSC report
implies that AMLASH was either an agent
for Castro, with the mission of provoking
a coup against Castro which in turn provided
Castro with the justification to kill Kennedy
(pp 3, 74, & 79 of SSC) or that AMLASH/1 was
so insecure that the operation became known
to Castro who then sought revenge.

Response by CIA - neither theory correct -
believe that the character of the
relationship b/w CIA & AMLASH before JFK's
death was so "insubstantial and inconclusive"
that it provided no basis for AMLASH/1
to feel that he had any tangible CIA support
for plotting against Castro." p 1-2.
- little for him to report on back.

Agency understanding of the Operation

March, 1959 - AMLASH/1 reported as telling
Castro of his dissatisfaction with the
situation in Cuba.

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March 1961 - AMASH/1, met in Mexico City by a CIA case officer stationed there - occasion - the Latin America Conference on National Sovereignty, Emancipation, & Peace.

- meeting arranged by AMWHIP/1 - long time friend of AMASH/1.

p3 - a dispatch in July, 1961, which gave a general review of operations against Cubans, described the meeting:

The station made an unsuccessful approach to AMASH/1 - AMASH apparently did not report the incident to his superiors, however.

August, 1961 - AMWHIP/1 rptd plan by AMASH/1 to attend the French National Student Union Cultural Festival - AMASH/1 wanted to meet a friend of the case officer's. Do not know if the contact occurred.

June, 1962 - rpt that AMASH/1 would go to via Prague to World Youth Festival in Helsinki. AMASH/1 was rpt as wanting to defect; would pass through Paris en route & hoped to meet AMWHIP/1 there.

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p3 - the FBI, who knew of AMWHIP/1's association with CIA, ~~had~~ met AMWHIP/1 in Miami and took steps for him to be referred to a lawyer should he contact Paris legal offices

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p4.

July 1962 - CIA contacted AMULASHI, - who said he was angry with the way the CIA handled the "planned defection" in Paris in August 1961. Plan were made for ~~the~~ a CIA case officer & AMULASHI, to travel to Helsinki and anywhere else to secure defection.

1st series of meetings with AMULASHI, held in Helsinki as 1 Aug 62. AMULASHI, said if he could do something really significant he was interested in returning to Cuba to carry on the fight.

p4.

Security hazard of meeting in Helsinki too often led to meetings in Stockholm and Copenhagen.

AMULASHI, next met on 16-17 Aug in Paris - AMULASHI, + 2 case officers present.

AMULASHI, given SW training & supplies -

20 August AMULASHI, taken to Southern France for a demolition demonstration.

11112673

p5.

Case officer rpt on 17 August -

"Have no vehicles give [AMULASHI,] physical elimination mission as requirement but recognizing this something he could on night try to carry out on his own initiative."

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~~SECRET~~

Headquarters replied next day:

"Strongly concern that no phys. eliminated
missions be given AMLASH/11" P5

29 Aug 62 - AMLASH/11 left Prague by air for
Havana - last time he ever met until he
left Cuba in September, 1963.

Comment -

note that AMLASH/11 not a recruited
agent during the above time - nor was he
ever for that matter - as OA was
never granted for this purpose.

- by end of Aug 1962 - CIA relationship with
AMLASH had made no real progress.

- over a year passed until next contact by CIA

P5. - critical period : 5 Sept - 22 Nov 63.

AMLASH/11 attended Collegiate Game in
Porto Alegre, Brazil from 5 Sept
9 Sept 1963, as a rep. of the
Cuban govt.

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P6 - met there by AMWHR/1 & by the CIA
case officer who was to take over the
relationship with him. ~~SECRET~~

AMLASH/11 said he had written two
SW messages (alg 1 had been received)

~~SECRET~~

- CIA say they did not contact AMLASH/1 for over one year because he never left Cuba.

p6

- at this point (5 Sept 1963) there was "no evidence (that)... an assassination operator was intended", and it was "quite clear that it was not under consideration."

- the problem at that time was how to deal with the man.

- CIA did not feel AMLASH was reliable enough to rely on at that point -
- viewed as a person of "uncertain ~~capable~~ capabilities"

p 8

7 Sept 63 cable - CIA feel this cable left things very much up in the air - cable said "AMLAsh still feels there only two ways to accomplish change either inside job or invasion he realistic enough to realize latter out of question. According AMWHP, AMLASH still "awaiting for US reveal plan of action".

(X)

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p8

the SSC thought that inside job referred to something against Castro; the CIA say it is a general comment about how to bring about change.

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- also, CIA says AMASH assault a US plan of action - said this signifies that they will still be in the air.

(X) - CIA notes that at this point Book II states that "characterization of this phase of the AMASH operation is disputed" (p14, footnote 17). CIA says any dispute only arises in the eye of the SSC.

sec

p9

- also mentions an interview Castro held with an AP reporter, DANIEL Harker, in which Castro said anti-castro terrorists had the support of US leaders.
(X) intended inference - AMASH, may have reported to Castro what the SSC characterized as their assassination plots. -

include

CIA response - "Castro's remarks at West Point could not have stemmed from anything said to AMASH, by CIA officers as they proposed nothing & undertaken nothing" p. 10.

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AMASH, - Dances - 14 Sept - to attend a meeting of ALLIANCE FRANCIA. trip actually for an extended vacation, which he intended to report to Castro later.

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~~SECRET~~

on 16 Sept - he wrote AMWHT/P. & said (a) he did not intend to be interviewed by your friend again. (refers to CIA case office).

3 Oct 63 - case officer will went to Paris -

11 Oct 63 - case officer called hdq - ~~said~~ that AMLASHT/P. claimed to have the pre- people & enough to overthrow Castro w/out U.S. assistance.

p 11. AMLASHT/P. apld. on making a meeting with a senior official, preferably Robert Kennedy, to be sure of U.S. support.

21 Oct cable to Wash rephd 17 Oct meeting with AMLASHT/P. - want U.S. support if his op is successful.

Desmond Fitzgerald - then Chief of Sp. Affairs Staff - going to France on other business - + undertook to meet AMLASHT - plan for the meeting:

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1) Fitzgerald will represent self a personal representative of Robert F. Kennedy who travelled to Paris for specific purpose of meeting (AMLASHT/P.) and giving him assurances of full U.S. support if there is a change of the present gov. in Cuba. 11
(emphasis added)

p. 11

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29 Oct - Fitz - AMIAST/1 in Paris -

up as a spokesman for Robert F. Kennedy.

3rd person at meeting - case officer who was the interpreter.

(S)
Critical
meeting

13 NOV - memorandum summarizing the meeting -

goal \Rightarrow support forthcoming only after a real coup has been effected and

the group is position to request U.S. support

p 12

\rightarrow in 1967 IIG
Report

p. 13

Fitz recalled that AMIAST/1, repeatedly made reference to the need for an assassination weapon. He wanted a high-power rifle with telescopic lens, a sonic device weapon that could be used to kill Carter from a distance. Fitz said he rejected this request.

NOTE: the case officer's memo did not refer specifically to assassination or a weapon. merely says that nothing of operational nature discussed; AMIAST/1 did request, however, desire to know, however, what technical support could be given.

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14 NOV 63 - AMIAST/1 met in N.Y.C \Rightarrow rpt

on AMIAST/1 reaction to the Oct 29 meeting -

(S) as he related:

not happy about no tech. support.

- could not understand why they would not give him technical support

~~SECRET~~

p14

CIA note that at the point it was clear that AMASH was told there would be no US support until after the pact - contrary to statement by SSC (p 18) of Final Report to the effect that it was not clear how AMASH /, interpreted the put off by Fitzgerald.

(*)

- also cites July 1964 FBI report as evidence that AMASH knew he had been turned down on Oct 29 by Fitzgerald.

p15

following the 14 Nov meeting with AMASH /, the CIA reviewed what could be done to maintain contact with AMASH / -

(*)

on 19 Nov 63 Fitz approved telling AMASH /, he would be given a cache inside Cuba - it could, if he requested it, include high powered rifles w scope.

19 Nov - AMASH /, told CIA officer he planned to return to Cuba

(*)

20 Nov - Hdq cabled Paris & requested that AMASH delay departure to permit one more meeting which AMASH requested.

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that same day AMASH agreed to remain -

- the CIA says still no specific offer was made - says that AMASH/1 agreed to stay "if it is something interesting". Case officer replied "he could not assure it interesting but that it was to be a meeting which AMASH had requested."

P 16

- Case officer arrived from Wash in Paris on the morning of the 22nd - met AMASH/1, late in the afternoon - learned of Kennedy's arrival as they left the meeting - probably were meeting when Kennedy was shot -

p16 - Conclusion by CIA

1) Whatever the relationship with AMASH/1, following the death of President Kennedy, there is every indication that during President Kennedy's life AMASH/1 had no basis for believing that he had CIA support for much of anything. Were he a provocateur reporting to Castro, or if he was merely a teller & learned what he knew, he had no factual basis for learning or reporting any actual CIA plot directed against Castro

P 16

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~~SECRET~~

p23 AMIASTH was arrested - does not say when served 10 yrs of a 30 yr term - his public trial did not mention his agency assoc for march 1961 to Nov 1964.

also, when Castro - Mc Jones list of people - AMIASTH/1, among those - the reported period, however, did not include March 1961 to Nov 64.

IG Report - 1977 - completed. - all TABS (A - G).

11112681

~~SECRET~~